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Institutional Environ- 
ments and Resource De- 
pendence: Sources of 
Administrative Structure 
in Institutions of Higher 
Education 
Pamela S. Tolbert 
Two theoretical perspectives are combined to explain the 
pattern of administrative offices in public and private in- 
stitutions of higher education. The first perspective, re- 
source dependence, is used to show that the need to 
ensure a stable flow of resources from external sources of 
support partially determines administrative differentiation. 
The second perspective, institutionalization, emphasizes 
the common understandings and social definitions of 
organizational behavior and structure considered 
appropriate and nonproblematic and suggests conditions 
under which dependency will and will not predict the 
number of administrative offices that manage funding rela- 
tions. The results of the analyses indicate that dependence 
on nontraditional sources of support is a strong predictor 
of administrative differentiation and demonstrate the 
validity of integrating these two theoretical perspectives. 
In explaining the formal structure of organizations, classic 
organization theory emphasizes problems of coordination and 
control of work activities (e.g., Taylor, 1911; Weber, 1946; 
Simon, 1956). Reflecting this tradition, research on sources of 
growth in the administrative component of organizations has 
typically focused on factors such as size and complexity that 
are assumed to impede the efficient supervision of tasks 
(Terrien and Mills, 1955; Bendix, 1956; Anderson and Warkov, 
1961; Pondy, 1969; Blau, 1970; Hsu, Marsh, and Mannari, 
1983). 
Recent work on this problem, however, places greater empha- 
sis on environmental relations and influences than on internal 
relationships as determinants of administrative structure (Free- 
man, 1973; Meyer and Brown, 1977). A number of different 
perspectives on organizational environments and the way in 
which environments affect organizational behavior and struc- 
ture have emerged. In one, the environment is conceptualized 
in terms of other organizations with which the focal organiza- 
tion engages in direct exchange relations (Levine and White, 
1961; Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Adminis- 
trative structure, from this perspective, reflects efforts to 
ensure a stable flow of resources and to manage problems and 
uncertainties associated with exchange transactions. Increas- 
ing dependence on exchange relationships produces adminis- 
trative differentiation as organizations create offices and posi- 
tions to manage these relationships. 
In a second approach, the environment is conceptualized in 
terms of understandings and expectations of appropriate orga- 
nizational form and behavior that are shared by members of 
society (Zucker, 1977, 1983). Such normative understandings 
constitute the institutional environment of organizations. Orga- 
nizations experience pressure to adapt their structure and 
behavior to be consistent with the institutional environment in 
order to ensure their legitimacy and, hence, their chances of 
survival (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). 
This research integrates these two perspectives to explain 
administrative differentiation in colleges and universities. A 
central premise of this approach is that dependency rela- 
tionships can, over time, become socially defined as appropri- 
ate and legitimate. It is hypothesized that when relations are 
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institutionalized in this way, variations among organizations in 
actual level of dependency will be unrelated to the number of 
administrative offices associated with the management of the 
relations. When an organization enters into an exchange rela- 
tionship that runs counter to institutionalized patterns, howev- 
er, the maintenance of this relationship will generally require 
intensive administrative ffort. It is hypothesized that when 
relations are not institutionalized, increasing dependence will 
be directly associated with the proliferation of administrative 
offices to manage the relationship. Thus, the institutional en- 
vironment defines the conditions under which increased de- 
pendency leads to administrative differentiation. This research 
investigates these hypotheses, focusing on patterns of de- 
pendence among higher education institutions and the number 
of administrative offices that manage these dependencies. 
THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCE 
DEPENDENCE 
In modern, rational-legal societies, organizations are typified as 
systems of rationally ordered rules and activities (Weber, 
1946). Because of this shared typification, behavior that occurs 
in an organizational setting is particularly apt to be perceived as 
rational and "fact-like," not reflecting the random error of 
personal idiosyncracies. In this context, organizational prac- 
tices and policies readily become institutionalized, that is, they 
become widely accepted as legitimate, rational means to attain 
organizational goals (Zucker, 1977; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Scott and Meyer, 1983). Such widespread social conceptions 
of appropriate organizational form and behavior constitute the 
institutional environment of organizations. Organizations ex- 
perience pressure to conform to these common understand- 
ings of rational and efficient structure, since violating them 
may call into question the legitimacy of the organization and 
thus affect its ability to obtain resources and social support 
(Rowan, 1982; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). 
Using this framework, two additional propositions are ad- 
vanced here. The first is that the institutional environment of 
organizations is differentiated. It is not that some organizations 
are constrained by the institutional environment while others 
are not; rather, there are different expectations for different 
types of organizations. Many of the commonplace distinctions 
that are drawn between public and private organizations reflect 
such differentiated expectations. Second, patterns of interor- 
ganizational exchange relations, as well as elements of struc- 
ture, are presumed to be subject to the process of institutional- 
ization. In other words, in the institutional environment there 
are normative understandings of appropriate and inappropriate 
organizational dependency patterns.1 
Structural arrangements associated with institutionalized e- 
pendencies often become institutionalized as well. Thus, orga- 
nizations characterized by a common, socially defined de- 
pendency pattern will exhibit similar structural features - 
common administrative offices, formal policies, and so forth. 
Since these elements of structure are part of the organizations' 
institutional environment, their presence in organizations will 
not be directly related to actual increases or decreases in the 
level of dependency. 
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The intense debate over the bail-out of the 
Chrysler Corporation by the federal govern- 
ment is a highly visible example of the 
institutionalized nature of dependencies. 
Criticisms of the government's actions 
clearly reflected not only long-run cost con- 
cerns, but common conceptions of the 
appropriateness and legitimacy of public 
support of a private organization (see 
Chapman, 1979; Friedman, 1979; Samuel- 
son, 1979). 
Sources of Administrative Structure 
Dependency relations that are not institutionalized are general- 
ly less predictable, more uncertain. As these relations become 
an increasingly important source of support for the organiza- 
tion, the number of administrative offices and positions associ- 
ated with the management of the relations is likely to grow. In 
this case, the magnitude of dependency will predict adminis- 
trative differentiation. Formal offices are created to serve a 
directly functional role in negotiating and managing the de- 
mands and problems accompanying the relationship. They 
serve a symbolic role as well, since their presence can act as 
an indicator, or signal, of the organization's commitment to the 
exchange relationship (Spence, 1973, 1974; Meyer, 1979). 
Thus, the institutionalization of dependency relations deter- 
mines whether or not increasing dependence will directly 
affect the proliferation of formal administrative offices within 
organizations. 
ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFERENTIATION A D PATTERNS OF 
DEPENDENCE 
In applying these ideas to an examination of administrative 
differentiation in colleges and universities, distinctions must be 
made between public and private institutions. The two types of 
institutions have a long-standing tradition of drawing on differ- 
ent sources of financial support. Public institutions have typi- 
cally relied heavily on governmental sources of support, espe- 
cially support from state legislatures, while private institutions 
have received their income primarily from tuition, endow- 
ments, and gifts and grants from private donors. 
These patterns derive historically from a major legal decision 
addressing the issue of state control over institutions of higher 
education. During the colonial period, state governments pro- 
vided substantial subsidies to private institutions within their 
jurisdictions. In 1819, however, a Supreme Court ruling estab- 
lished the autonomy of private higher education institutions 
from government supervision and control. Following this deci- 
sion, states rapidly withdrew support from these institutions 
(Rudolph, 1962; Brubacher and Rudy, 1965). While private 
institutions became increasingly reliant on tuition and privately 
sponsored endowment funds as primary sources of revenues, 
an ideology developed to accompany this independence, 
promoted largely by the institutions themselves. As Rudolph 
(1962: 189) noted, "Before long, college presidents would be 
talking like President Eliot [of Harvard University] as spokes- 
men for rugged individualism, for the virtues of independence 
and freedom from state support." 
Over time, differences in dependency relations for public and 
private colleges and universities have become institutional- 
ized; dependence on different sources of support is viewed as 
an appropriate difference between the two types of organiza- 
tions. Patterns of support for public and private colleges and 
universities provide evidence of the institutionalization of these 
dependencies, as shown in Table 1. 
Private institutions have regularly derived approximately 10 
percent of their income from private gifts and donations, 
whereas public institutions have typically received only about 2 
percent of their income from this source. Public institutions, on 
the other hand, have been able to depend heavily on state and 
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Table 1 
Percentage of Revenues of Public and Private Colleges and Universities from Major Sources of Support, 
1939-1974* 
Public Private 
State Federal Tuition Gifts State Federal Tuition Gifts 
1939-49 61.9 13.5 20.3 1.9 3.1 .1 57.0 13.8 
1953-54 65.6 16.0 13.3 3.1 2.6 19.1 47.0 16.6 
1959-60 59.4 21.6 13.2 3.4 2.1 25.9 43.8 15.6 
1961-62 44.0 18.6 10.4 2.4 1.7 23.2 32.4 10.6 
1963-64 42.9 19.1 11.2 2.2 3.0 26.5 30.4 10.6 
1967-68 44.5 17.8 11.6 .6 1.3 28.2 33.6 7.6 
1970-71 47.5 11.7 13.1 1.9 2.2 12.1 35.8 9.5 
1971--72 46.3 11.8 13.7 1.9 2.2 11.8 35.8 9.7 
1972-73 47.1 12.1 13.4 2.0 2.3 11.5 35.6 9.4 
1973-74 47.9 11.1 12.9 2.0 2.7 11.0 35.8 9.5 
*Data for the years 1939-1960 are from O'Neill (1973); data for the remaining years are from U.S. Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare, National Center for Education Statistics, Financial Statistics of Higher Education. 
local legislatures for support. This is clearly not the case for 
their private counterparts. Moreover, the proportion of reve- 
nues derived from each of these major sources shows remark- 
ably little variation within each set of institutions over the 
20-year period. Only revenues from the federal government 
show any substantial change, reflecting waxing and waning 
support for academic research. This overall stability suggests 
strongly institutionalized patterns of dependency relations. Pri- 
vate donors and alumni target private colleges and universities 
as appropriate beneficiaries of their largesse, while govern- 
ment agencies favor those in the public sector as appropriate 
recipients. 
Consequently, public institutions typically find it more difficult 
to obtain significant financial support from private funding 
agencies and alumni than do private institutions. The latter, in 
turn, often find governmental bodies, particularly state and 
local legislatures, extremely reluctant o offer financial support. 
A small but noteworthy indication of this is the move by many 
private institutions to relabel themselves as "independents." 
This accompanies efforts by these institutions to attract public 
sources of funding (Breneman and Finn, 1982). 
It has been argued that it is only when dependency relations 
are not institutionalized that the degree of dependency will 
predict administrative differentiation. Thus, it is hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 1: Dependence on public sources of support will strongly 
predict the number of administrative offices that manage public- 
funding relations among private institutions. 
Hypothesis la: Dependence on public sources of support will not 
predict the number of public-funding offices among public institutions. 
Hypothesis 2: Dependence on private sources of support will strong- 
ly predict the number of administrative offices that manage private- 
funding relations among public institutions. 
Hypothesis 2a: Dependence on private sources of support will not 
predict the number of private-funding offices among private 
institutions. 
If differentiation is linked simply to the management of particu- 
lar types of dependency relations, there should be no interac- 
tion effects of control and dependency as predictors of dif- 
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ferentiation. If administrative differentiation is affected by the 
institutionalization of the relationship, dependence on particu- 
lar sources of support should show an interactive relationship 
with control in predicting differentiation. 
METHOD 
Data 
Data used in the analyses are from the Higher Education 
General Information Survey (National Center for Education 
Statistics, 1980) and other secondary data sources for 1975- 
1976. The survey is conducted annually among two- and 
four-year institutions of higher education in the United States 
and gathers a variety of information on these institutions, 
including enrollment, sources of revenues, and expenditure 
patterns. In addition, the survey asks respondents to list key 
administrative officers and their positions; each position is 
then assigned a common job code, based on the description of 
the associated administrative responsibilities. These data have 
two advantages. First, they are the only publicly available data 
on college and university administration at the national level. 
Second, because common job codes are assigned, there is no 
problem with functionally equivalent offices having different 
job titles. 
Sample 
The sample was drawn from the set of higher education 
institutions classified by the Carnegie Commission as either 
doctorate-granting or as "comprehensive." This included all 
major research institutions, universities granting at least 20 
Ph.D.'s yearly, and institutions offering professional programs 
in addition to a basic liberal arts curriculum. These institutions 
were stratified by public and private control, and a random 
sample was drawn within each stratum. The resulting sample 
contained 281 institutions, of which 167 were public and 1 14 
were private. 
Measuring Administrative Differentiation 
From the list of coded administrative positions, six were 
selected as having major responsibility for managing relations 
with external sources of financial support. These were used to 
measure the dependent variables, the number of offices with 
primary responsibility for the management of private-funding 
sources and the number responsible for dealing with public- 
funding sources. 
Administrative positions with responsibility for managing pri- 
vate funding include those of chief development officer, direc- 
tor of alumni relations, and director of admissions. The job 
description of the duties of the chief development officer 
includes obtaining financial support from alumni and other 
organizations, coordinating volunteer fund-raising activities, 
and managing general public relations activities (Jones, 1977). 
The duties of the director of alumni relations are very similar, 
though obviously targeted specifically at alumni groups. The 
director of admissions is responsible for the recruitment, 
selection, and admission of students. Since tuition'fees are 
often a significant source of private-sector support, how the 
recruitment and selection processes are managed can have an 
important impact on the institution's support base. 
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Responsibility for dealing with sources of public funding is 
assigned to the director of the information office, the chief 
planning officer, and the director of institutional research. The 
duties of the director of the information office center on 
providing information about the institution to students, faculty, 
and the general public. This includes preparing and reviewing 
news releases and information bulletins, and managing rela- 
tions with the news media. The director of institutional re- 
search carries out research on the institution itself and dis- 
seminates this information to appropriate sources (e.g., legisla- 
tive or governmental agencies). The responsibilities of the 
chief planning officer include monitoring and managing state 
and federal relations, as well as long-range planning to allocate 
institutional resources. It should be noted that the office of 
each serves a variety of functions, not all directly involving 
funding relations. 
Table 2 shows the percentage of public and private institutions 
that report having each of these administrative positions. The 
percentage of private institutions reporting the presence of a 
Table 2 
Percentage of Public and Private Institutions Reporting Selected 
Administrative Positions for Funding Relations 
Administrative positions Public Private 
Chief Development Officer 47.9 83.3 
Director of Admissions 66.5 86.8 
Director of Alumni Relations 50.3 61.4 
Chief Planning Officer 43.7 28.9 
Director of Information 43.1 25.4 
Director of Institutional Research 45.5 24.6 
chief development officer and a director of admissions is 
significantly higher than that of public institutions. A noticeably 
higher proportion of private institutions also reports having a 
director of alumni relations, although the difference does not 
reach significance. Public institutions, on the other hand, report 
significantly more often having the positions that manage 
relations associated with sources of public funding. 
These results accord with expectations derived from both the 
institutionalization and resource dependence perspectives. In 
the first perspective, structural patterns are expected to be 
associated with institutionalized ependencies. Thus, the 
greater frequency of private-funding offices among private 
institutions and public-funding offices among public institu- 
tions is predicted. Likewise, from a resource dependence 
perspective, private-funding offices would be expected to 
occur more frequently among private institutions that presum- 
ably depend more heavily on private sources of support, while 
the reverse would be expected for public-funding offices. 
However, the resource dependence perspective suggests that 
increasing dependence should predict an increase in such 
offices, regardless of the type of organizational control. If, in 
contrast, the creation of these offices is affected by the 
institutionalization of dependency relations, increased depen- 
dence on public funding should be a better predictor of the 
occurrence of the three public-funding offices in private institu- 
tions than in public ones. Similarly, the creation of the three 
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private-funding offices should be more strongly predicted by 
dependence on private funds in public universities. 
Measuring Dependence 
Dependence was measured by the proportion of the institu- 
tion's total revenues derived from four primary sources of 
support: government appropriations, government grants and 
contracts, gifts and grants from private sources, and "self- 
generated" funds -tuition, fees, and endowment income. 
The first category, government appropriations, is a source of 
support traditionally viewed as a mainstay of public institu- 
tions, while the last two categories are support that is conven- 
tionally associated with private status. Although public and 
private institutions have both received government grants and 
contracts for research since World War 11 (Nelson, 1978), 
government grants will be treated here as technically a public 
source of support. 
Control Variables 
In addition to the measures of dependency, the analyses 
included two other independent variables as controls: size and 
a measure of research orientation. Size, measured here by 
total student enrollment, has often been linked to administra- 
tive differentiation (Terrien and Mills, 1955; Blau, 1970; Hsu, 
Marsh, and Mannari, 1983). This measure was logged to 
correct for skewedness. The complexity of administration in 
institutions with a strong research orientation, measured by 
the percentage of total expenditures allocated for research 
activities, might also be expected to produce administrative 
differentiation. Thus, these variables were included to ensure 
that the observed relationships were not merely reflections of 
differences in size or between research and nonresearch 
institutions. 
ANALYSIS 
To test the effects of resource dependence on administrative 
differentiation, two dependent variables were created, one 
based on the number of public-funding offices reported and 
one based on the number of private-funding offices reported. 
Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations of the 
variables by type of institution. 
Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations of Resource-Dependence Variables by Type of Institution 
Public (N= 167) Private (N= 114) 
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Size (in 1 000's) 16.511 11.214 8.722 6.556 
% Expendituresforresearch 9.133 8.691 8.344 8.822 
% Revenues 
Government appropriations 48.044 13.659 2.345 4.920 
Government grants 11.708 7.506 13.642 10.217 
Private gifts 2.462 2.242 7.837 5.275 
Self-generated 15.496 8.322 51.034 19.289 
Number of public-funding offices 1.396 .876 .876 .877 
Number of private-funding offices 1.718 .938 2.389 .760 
In each case, the dependent variable can assume one of only 
four possible values (0-3). Because multivariate linear analy- 
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ses are based on assumptions requring an interval evel of 
measurement for the dependent variable (Maddala, 1983), the 
use of ordinary-least-squares techniques is inappropriate.2 In- 
stead, an ordered probit model was employed. This is an 
extension of a dichotomous probit model that is applicable to 
analyses involving ordinal dependent variables (McKelvey and 
Zavoina, 1975; Winship and Mare, 1984). With this analytic 
procedure, a distinction is drawn between an underlying 
theoretical dependent variable, which has an interval scale of 
measurement, and the observed dependent variable, which is 
ordinal. In the present case, the latent theoretical variable may 
be thought of as the amount of pressure for administrative 
differentiation; the observed variable is the presence of zero, 
one, two, or three offices. 
More formally, if Y* is the underlying theoretical variable, and Y 
is the observed variable, then it is assumed: 
Y* = OX + u, (1) 
where u - N(O, &2). To set the scale of measurement, (2_1 
(see Joreskog and Sorbom, 1981). 
Then: 
OifY*<ao (2) 
Y _ 1 if ao < Y* < a 
a 2ifota <Y* < a2 
3 if U2< Y* 
The alphas in this equation represent the threshhold points in 
the distribution of Y* at which the observed Ytakes on a 
f (Y*) different value. The relationship between the latent variable, 
Y*, and the observed Yis depicted in Figure 1. 
L < '~~~~~~~~~Y 1 2= 
Y= 0 
Y= 3 
Figure 1: Relationship between observed ordinal variable (Y) and latent continuous variable (Y*). 
Combining the first two equations implies that: 
P(Y = OIX) = (3) 
P(Y*< OLX) = 
P(PX+ u< OL) = 
P(u < O0 - AX) = 
8/ASQ- Mar1 
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Linear egression models are based on the 
assumption that the distribution of data 
points around the regression line yields a 
set of error terms with a mean of zero and 
a constant variance. When dealing with an 
ordinal dependent variable, these assump- 
tions are generally not valid (McKelvey and 
Zavoina, 1975). 
Sources of Administrative Structure 
where F(o0 - PX) signifies a standard normal cumulative 
density function (see Figure 1). This can readily be extended to 
the other values of Y. Because ordered probit models take into 
account ceiling and floor restrictions on probabilities, they are 
highly preferable to linear models when the observed Yis 
markedly skewed (Winship and Mare, 1984). 
Maximum likelihood methods (Berndt et al., 1974; McKelvey 
and Zavoina, 1975; Chow, 1983) were used to obtain esti- 
mates of the parameters of the model. Separate analyses 
were carried out for each dependent variable, using the full 
sample of institutions. These analyses were then repeated, 
using the subsamples of public and private institutions. 
RESULTS 
Table 4 presents the results of the ordered probit analysis of 
the number of public-funding offices, using the full sample of 
institutions. The beta coefficients represent the slope coeffi- 
cients in the latent regression, or the increment in Y* brought 
about by a unit change in the independent variable. The first 
alpha coefficient is automatically set to zero for normalization. 
The other two alphas represent the remaining cutpoints in the 
distribution of Y*. The X is a test of the overall significance of 
the model, based on a comparison of the presented model 
with one in which the betas are constrained to be zero. 
Table 4 
Ordered Probit Analysis of Public-Funding Offices in Total Sample 
Independent variables B S.E. t-value 
Constant -.231 .200 -1.16 
Size .267-4 .774-5 3.450 
% Research expenditures -.006 .012 -.50 
Control (public) .653 .363 1 .70 
% Government appropriations .038 .033 1.12 
% Government grants .016 .013 1.17 
Control x appropriations -.032 .016 -1 .95g 
Control x grants -.028 .016 -1 .77 
at n 1.137 .095 12.00a 
OL2 2.183 .135 16.170 
Log L -333.07 
X 44.44000 
*1p<.10; *61p<.05; *00tp<.01. 
There are clear interactive effects of control and dependence 
on government grants and appropriations. Apart from size, the 
strongest and only significant predictors of the number of 
public-funding offices are public control and the interaction 
terms. 
In Table 5 the analysis is repeated, using the number of 
private-funding offices as the dependent variable. 
Dependence on private gifts and self-generated sources of 
funding are not, by themselves, strong predictors of the num- 
ber of offices. The interaction term for control and dependence 
on private gifts does emerge as significant, however, along 
with the terms for control and for size. 
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Table 5 
Ordered Probit Analysis of Private-Funding Offices in Total Sample 
Independent variables B S.E. t-value 
Constant 1.678 .499 3.36g 
Size .171-4 .763-5 2.251 
% Research expenditures .008 .009 .85 
Control (public) -1.210 .492 -2.460 
% Private gifts -.003 .022 -.14 
% Self-generated .013 .013 .57 
Control x gifts .061 .034 1.87 
Control x self-generated .013 .013 .98 
at 1 1.996 .113 8.790 
OL2 2.050 .133 15.410g 
Log L -333.65 
X 53.180 
*p<. 10; *6p<.05; *00tp<.01. 
Both analyses suggest, then, that the effect of dependency on 
administrative differentiation varies for public and private in- 
stitutions. To examine this more closely, the analyses were 
repeated, using the subsamples of each type of institution. 
The ordered probit analyses for public-funding offices by public 
and private institutions are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Ordered Probit Analysis of Public-Funding Offices in Public and Private Institutions 
Public Private 
Independent variables B S.E. t-value B S.E. t-value 
Constant .521 .343 1.52 -.469 .240 -1.960 
Size .187-4 .895-5 2.080 .680-4 .241 -4 2.83g 
% Research expenditures -.005 .013 -.34 -.020 .030 -.68 
% Government appropriations .005 .005 .97 .037 .018 1.9400 
% Government grants -.009 .015 -.64 .018 .023 .78 
Ot 1 1.156 .122 9.470 1.001 .253 6.780 
aL2 2.207 .167 13.23a 2.223 .177 11.38a 
Log L -209.49 -120.46 
X 6.30 18.62a 
*rx.10 16" *r nn * 101 1< . 
Among public institutions, only size emerges as a strong 
predictor. Increasing dependence on public sources of support 
has no substantial effect on the number of public-funding 
offices. Overall, the low value of X indicates that these vari- 
ables add little to the prediction of administrative differentia- 
tion. Among private institutions, on the other hand, depen- 
dence on governmental appropriations is significantly related 
to differentiation. The test statistic for the overall model is also 
significant in this case. These results, then, are consistent with 
the first hypothesis and its corollary. 
Table 7 presents the analyses for private-funding offices by 
type of institution. As hypothesized, increasing dependence on 
private sources of support, particularly private gifts, is a much 
stronger predictor of differentiation in public than in private 
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Table 7 
Ordered Probit Analysis of Private-Funding Offices in Public and Private Institutions 
Public Private 
Independent variables B S.E. t-value B S.E. t-value 
Constant .475 .250 1.90g 1.567 .695 2.540 
Size .10o-4 .834-5 1.20 .686-4 .297-4 2.3100 
% Research expenditures .016 .012 1.33 -.021 .020 -1.06 
% Private gifts .059 .030 1 .92g .006 .025 .24 
% Self-generated .018 .012 1.51 .001 .008 .06 
Ot 1 .957 .112 7.810 1.166 .292 3.99a 
aL2 2.060 .153 13.470 2.179 .307 7.090 
Log L -212.87 -117.20 
X 13.92a 9.00 
*ne. 1 bn no grind.05 1011p.l 
institutions. In the latter case, the measures of dependence on 
each source have virtually no relationship to the number of 
private-funding offices. Thus, these results provide support for 
the second set of hypotheses as well. 
As expected, dependence on public or private sources of 
funding predicts the proliferation of administrative offices only 
when the dependencies are not aligned with traditional pat- 
terns. In other words, dependence on a given exchange rela- 
tionship may or may not lead to the creation of offices and 
positions to manage those relationships. Since institutionalized 
dependencies are often accompanied by the institutionaliza- 
tion of structural components, organizations characterized by 
such relations adopt those components ceremonially, indepen- 
dent of actual levels of support. Thus, increasing dependence 
does not necessarily produce administrative differentiation. It 
is only when dependency relations are not institutionalized that 
increasing dependence is strongly associated with the de- 
velopment of separate administrative offices to manage them. 
DISCUSSION 
These analyses suggest that an institutionalization perspective 
defines conditions under which hypotheses generated by a 
resource dependence perspective will hold. There are, howev- 
er, alternative explanations and modifications of this argument 
to be considered. First, it could be argued that the results of 
the analysis simply reflect the limited variance of the indepen- 
dent variables when dependencies follow traditional patterns. 
Examination of the means and standard deviations of the 
variables, shown in Table 3, substantially weakens the plausi- 
bility of this argument. None of the measures of traditional 
dependencies (e.g., government appropriations among public 
institutions, gifts and donations among private institutions) has 
a markedly restricted variance. The range for the measure of 
dependence on government appropriations among public in- 
stitutions is from 10 to 84 percent of total revenues; the range 
for dependence on private gifts is from 1 to 33 percent among 
private institutions. Thus, this alternative is not supported by 
the data. 
It might also be argued that the relationship between depen- 
dence and administrative differentiation should be reciprocal. 
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While a plausible case may be made for this, the central 
concern of the present analysis is to demonstrate the link 
between two general theoretical perspectives that focus pri- 
marily on the sources of administrative differentiation rather 
than on the consequences. The latter, however, remains an 
interesting problem for further research. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Contemporary research on organizations has produced a varie- 
ty of theoretical perspectives, each pointing to different ex- 
planatory factors. Although the complementarity of different 
perspectives is sometimes acknowledged (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 
1976; Ulrich and Barney, 1984), empirical research typically 
draws on a single theoretical approach in explaining particular 
cases of organizational behavior and structure. Positive out- 
comes are interpreted as evidence of the validity of that 
perspective. 
It is clear, however, that most of the perspectives that current- 
ly guide research are not truly competitive, such that support 
for one undermines another. Instead, they are more likely 
simply to be applicable under different conditions, as was the 
case in this study. By combining resource dependence and 
institutionalization perspectives, a much fuller explanation of 
the process of administrative differentiation was provided than 
could have been provided by either perspective independently. 
Organizational phenomena are much too complex to be de- 
scribed adequately by any single theoretical approach. Current 
research on organizations could benefit greatly if researchers 
were to pay closer attention to specifying the points of in- 
tersection of different theoretical perspectives and to combin- 
ing these perspectives to provide more complete explanations 
of the behaviors they study. 
REFERENCES 
Aldrich, Howard, and Jeffrey 
Pfeffer 
1976 "Environments of organiza- 
tions." In A. Inkeles (ed.), 
Annual Review of Sociology, 2: 
79-1 05. Palo Alto, CA: Annual 
Reviews. 
Anderson, Theodore, and Seymour 
Warkov 
1961 "Organizational size and func- 
tional complexity: A study of 
administration in hospitals." 
American Sociological Review, 
26: 23-38. 
Bendix, Reinhard 
1956 Work and Authority in Industry 
New York: Wiley. 
Berndt, E. K., B. H. Hall, R. E. Hall, 
and J. A. Hausman 
1974 "Estimation and inference in 
non-linear structural models." 
Annals of Economic and Social 
Measurement, 3: 653-666. 
Blau, Peter 
1970 "A formal theory of differentia- 
tion in organizations." Amer- 
ican Sociological Review, 35: 
201-218. 
Breneman, David, and Chester 
Finn, Jr. 
1982 "An uncertain future." In D. 
Breneman and C. Finn (eds.), 
Public Policy and Private High- 
er Education: 1-62. Washing- 
ton, DC: Brookings. 
Brubacher, John, and Willis Rudy 
1965 Higher Education in Transition. 
New York: Harper& Row. 
Chapman, Stephen 
1979 "No-fault capitalism." New Re- 
public, 181 (November 17): 
11-14. 
Chow, Gregory 
1983 Econometrics. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
DiMaggio, Paul, and Walter Powell 
1983 "The iron cage revisited: Insti- 
tutional isomorphism and col- 
lective rationality in organiza- 
tional fields." American 
Sociological Review, 48: 147- 
160. 
Freeman, John 
1973 "Environment, technology and 
the administrative intensity of 
manufacturing organizations." 
American Sociological Review, 
38: 750-763. 
Friedman, Milton 
1979 "Are jobs the issue?" News- 
week, 94 (September 10): 66. 
Hsu, Cheng-Kuang, Robert Marsh, 
and Hiroshi Mannari 
1983 "An examination of the deter- 
minants of organizational struc- 
ture." American Journal of 
Sociology, 88: 975-996. 
12/ASQ, March 1985 
Sources of Administrative Structure 
Jones, Dennis 
1977 A Manual for Budgeting and 
Accounting for Manpower Re- 
sources in Postsecondary 
Education. Washington, DC: 
National Center for Education 
Statistics. 
Joreskog, Karl, and Dag Sorbom 
1981 Analysis of Linear Structural 
Relationships by Maximum 
Likelihood and Least Squares 
Methods. Uppsala: University 
of Uppsala. 
Levine, Sol, and Paul White 
1961 "Exchange as a conceptual 
framework for the study of in- 
terorganizational rela- 
tionships." Administrative Sci- 
ence Quarterly, 5: 583-601. 
Maddala, G. S. 
1983 Limited Dependent and Qual- 
itative Variables in Econo- 
metrics. Cambridge: Cam- 
bridge University Press. 
McKelvey, Richard, and William 
Zavoina 
1975 "A statistical model for the 
analysis of ordinal level depen- 
dent variables." Journal of 
Mathematical Sociology, 4: 
103-1 20. 
Meyer, John, and Brian Rowan 
1977 "Institutionalized organiza- 
tions: Formal structure as 
myth and ceremony." Amer- 
ican Journal of Sociology, 83: 
340-363. 
Meyer, Marshall 
1979 "Organizational structure as 
signaling." Pacific Sociological 
Review, 22: 481-500. 
Meyer, Marshall, and M. Craig 
Brown 
1977 "The process of bureaucratiza- 
tion." American Journal of 
Sociology, 83: 364-385. 
National Center for Education 
Statistics 
1980 Longitudinal File of Financial, 
Enrollment and Faculty Statis- 
tics for Institutions of Higher 
Education: 1974-75 to 1977- 
78. Washington, DC: NCES. 
Nelson, Susan 
1978 "Financial trends and issues." 
In D. Breneman and C. Finn 
(eds.), Public Policy and Private 
Higher Education: 69-142. 
Washington, DC: Brookings. 
O'Neill, June 
1973 Sources of Funds to Colleges 
and Universities. Washington, 
DC: Carnegie Foundation. 
Pfeffer, Jeffrey, and Gerald 
Salancik 
1978 The External Control of Orga- 
nizations. New York: Harper& 
Row. 
Pondy, Louis 
1969 "The effects of size, complex- 
ity and ownership on adminis- 
trative intensity." Administra- 
tive Science Quarterly, 14: 
47-61. 
Rowan, Brian 
1982 "Organizational structure and 
the institutional environment: 
The case of public schools." 
Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 27: 259-279. 
Rudolph, Fredrick 
1962 The American College and Uni- 
versity. New York: Knopf. 
Samuelson, Paul 
1979 "Judging corporate handouts." 
Newsweek, 94 (August 13): 
58-61. 
Scott, Richard, and John Meyer 
1983 Organizational Environments. 
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Simon, Herbert 
1956 Administrative Behavior. New 
York: Macmillan. 
Spence, Michael 
1973 "Job market signaling." 
Quarterly Journal of Eco- 
nomics, 83: 355-374. 
1974 Market Signaling. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Taylor, Fredrick 
1911 Principles of Scientific Man- 
agement. New York: Harper & 
Row. 
Terrien, Fredric, and Donald Mills 
1955 "The effects of changing size 
on the internal structure of 
organizations." American 
Sociological Review, 20: 11- 
13. 
Thompson, James 
1967 Organizations in Action. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Tolbert, Pamela, and Lynne Zucker 
1983 "Institutional sources of 
change in organizational struc- 
ture: The diffusion of civil ser- 
vice reform, 1880-1930." 
Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 23: 22-39. 
Ulrich, David, and Jay Barney 
1984 "Perspectives in organizations: 
Resource dependence, effi- 
ciency and population." 
Academy of Management Re- 
view, 9: 471-481. 
Weber, Max 
1946 Essays in Sociology. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Winship, Christopher, and Robert 
Mare 
1984 "Regression models with 
ordinal variables." American 
Sociological Review, 49: 512- 
525. 
Zucker, Lynne 
1977 "The role of institutionalization 
in cultural persistence." Amer- 
ican Sociological Review, 42: 
725-743. 
1983 "Organizations as institu- 
tions." In S. Bacharach (ed.), 
Research in the Sociology of 
Organizations, 2: 1-47. Green- 
wich, CT: JAI Press. 
13/ASQ, March 1985 
